The collapse of Afghanistan in August 2021 is often framed as a singular failure of the Biden administration, but the record shows a far more complex lineage. Under the 2020 Doha Agreement, the Trump administration negotiated directly with the Taliban while excluding the Afghan government, committed to a rapid U.S. withdrawal without enforceable conditions, and orchestrated a dramatic reduction in American forces. These decisions—combined with the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners, the closure of key U.S. airbases, and a refusal to share transition briefings with the incoming administration—left the United States with shrinking leverage and diminished capacity to execute a safe, orderly exit. This feature examines the documented diplomatic, military, and political choices that shaped the withdrawal trajectory, grounding each claim in primary-source evidence from inspector general reports, Pentagon testimony, and contemporaneous news accounts. The result is a clearer view of how policy choices made between 2018 and 2021 directly constrained the final months of the U.S. presence and shaped the outcome on the ground.