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Doha to Kabul. How the 2020 U.S.–Taliban Agreement Set the Stage for Afghanistan’s Collapse

November 29, 2024November 29, 2025By plicabl
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On August 15, 2021, the world watched in horror as desperate Afghans clung to departing American aircraft at Kabul’s airport, some falling to their deaths as the planes lifted off. The chaotic scenes marked the inglorious end of America’s longest war and sparked fierce debate about who bore responsibility for the debacle. While President Joe Biden made the final decision to withdraw and oversaw the evacuation, the conditions that led to the Taliban’s swift takeover were set in motion years earlier during the Trump administration’s pursuit of what it called “peace with honor.”

The story of how America lost Afghanistan begins not in August 2021, but in February 2020, when the Trump administration signed an agreement with the Taliban that fundamentally reshaped the conflict. This deal—negotiated without the participation of the Afghan government America had spent two decades building—created a cascading series of consequences that would ultimately doom that government and constrain Biden’s options. Understanding the full scope of Trump-era decisions is essential to any honest accounting of the withdrawal disaster.

Negotiating with the Enemy, Excluding the Ally

On February 29, 2020, in a gilded hotel in Doha, Qatar, U.S. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad sat across from Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban’s top political leader, and signed what both sides hoped would be a historic peace agreement. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo attended the ceremony, lending the weight of American authority to the proceedings.1 Notably absent from the table was any representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan—the internationally recognized government the United States had supported since 2001.

This exclusion was not an oversight but a deliberate choice. The Taliban had refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Afghan government, which they dismissed as an American puppet regime. Rather than insist on inclusive negotiations, the Trump administration acquiesced to this demand, conducting nine rounds of talks solely with the insurgent group.2 The decision would prove fateful, undermining the morale of Afghan forces and civilians alike.

The agreement itself was remarkably one-sided. In exchange for vague Taliban promises not to harbor terrorist groups and to enter into negotiations with the Afghan government, the United States committed to a complete withdrawal of all American and Coalition forces within fourteen months—by May 1, 2021. The Taliban made no binding commitment to cease violence against Afghan forces, did not have to recognize the Afghan government, and faced no meaningful enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance.3

Even some Trump administration officials later acknowledged the deal’s weaknesses. Lisa Curtis, a former senior National Security Council official who participated in the negotiations, told the Associated Press that “the Doha agreement was a very weak agreement, and the U.S. should have gained more concessions from the Taliban.”4 H.R. McMaster, Trump’s former national security adviser, was more blunt, calling it “a surrender agreement with the Taliban.”5

The Prisoner Release: 5,000 Taliban Return to Battle

Among the most consequential provisions of the Doha Agreement was a prisoner exchange designed as a “confidence-building measure.” The deal called for the release of up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners held by the Afghan government in exchange for 1,000 government prisoners held by the Taliban. Critically, the agreement stated: “The United States commits to completing this goal.”6

The Afghan government, which had not been consulted on this provision, initially resisted. President Ashraf Ghani convened a Loya Jirga—a traditional consultative council—to gain national consent for releasing prisoners who had killed Afghan soldiers and civilians. Afghan officials were particularly concerned about approximately 400 prisoners they deemed especially dangerous, having committed major crimes including attacks on international forces.7

Nevertheless, under sustained pressure from the Trump administration, including threats to withhold aid, the Afghan government relented. By September 2020, all 5,000 Taliban prisoners had been released.8 U.S. Special Representative Khalilzad later acknowledged the difficulty of this decision: “I know that none of us are happy about the release of prisoners that committed violence against our forces, but we want to keep the big picture in mind, unhappy as we are.”9

The consequences were swift and devastating. Confidential research obtained by Foreign Policy magazine revealed that the majority of released Taliban prisoners returned to the battlefield as commanders and fighters, in direct violation of their pledges not to pose a threat to Afghan security forces.10 The release fundamentally altered the power balance in Afghanistan, providing the Taliban with thousands of experienced fighters just as American forces were drawing down.

One particularly significant figure emerged from this period, though through a different channel. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban co-founder who signed the Doha Agreement, had been released from Pakistani custody in 2018 at the explicit request of the Trump administration. U.S. officials believed Baradar would be instrumental in facilitating peace negotiations.11 Instead, after the Taliban’s 2021 takeover, Baradar became one of the most powerful figures in the new regime, serving as first deputy prime minister—a bitter irony not lost on critics of the administration’s strategy.

Camp David and the Limits of Presidential Diplomacy

If the substance of the Doha Agreement troubled some observers, the Trump administration’s initial plan for finalizing it shocked even more. In early September 2019, President Trump intended to host Taliban leaders at Camp David—the presidential retreat where historic peace accords have been brokered—for a summit that would also include Afghan President Ghani. The timing was particularly inflammatory: the meeting was scheduled for just days before the 18th anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.12

The plan met fierce resistance from within Trump’s own administration. Vice President Mike Pence and National Security Adviser John Bolton both opposed the idea, raising concerns about the symbolism of hosting a designated terrorist organization at a site where Presidents George W. Bush and his advisers had planned America’s response to 9/11.13 The optics were inescapable: Taliban leaders would sit at the very table where U.S. officials had plotted the overthrow of their regime less than two decades earlier.

Nevertheless, Trump pressed forward, seeing the summit as an opportunity for a diplomatic coup comparable to his meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The president believed he could personally broker a deal that had eluded his negotiators. As one person familiar with his thinking told CNN, “The dramatic display of talks with sworn US enemies carried a similar made-for-television appeal.”14

The meeting never happened. On September 7, 2019, just days before the scheduled summit, Trump abruptly canceled it via Twitter, citing a Taliban attack in Kabul that killed twelve people, including a U.S. service member. “What kind of people would kill so many in order to seemingly strengthen their bargaining position?” Trump wrote. “They didn’t, they only made it worse!”15

Even so, the fact that the meeting had been planned at all drew bipartisan condemnation. Representative Liz Cheney, a Wyoming Republican, declared: “Camp David is where America’s leaders met to plan our response after al Qaeda, supported by the Taliban, killed 3000 Americans on 9/11. No member of the Taliban should set foot there. Ever.”16 Representative Adam Kinzinger, a Republican who served in Afghanistan, expressed “disbelief” that Taliban leaders would be invited to Camp David “in the week of 9/11.”17

Aaron David Miller, a veteran Middle East negotiator, captured the fundamental problem with the approach in an analysis for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Comparing the proposed Taliban meeting unfavorably to historic Camp David summits, Miller wrote: “Sure you negotiate with your enemies. But you don’t host Taliban leaders at your historic presidential retreat days after they claimed responsibility for yet another deadly attack in Kabul.”18

The Drawdown: From 13,000 to 2,500

While the diplomatic maneuvering captured headlines, the Trump administration was simultaneously implementing dramatic reductions in U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. At the time of the Doha Agreement’s signing, approximately 13,000 American troops were stationed in the country. The agreement called for an initial reduction to 8,600 troops within 135 days, followed by a complete withdrawal within fourteen months if conditions were met.19

The Trump administration adhered to this timeline with remarkable fidelity, despite mounting evidence that the Taliban was not upholding its end of the bargain. By mid-2020, U.S. forces had been reduced to approximately 8,600. Then, in a surprise announcement in November 2020—just days after Trump lost his reelection bid—Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller revealed that force levels would be reduced to 2,500 by January 15, 2021, just five days before Biden’s inauguration.20

This final drawdown was particularly controversial. Senior military officials had cautioned against rapid reductions, warning that Afghan forces needed continued American support. The move also appeared to violate congressional intent—the National Defense Authorization Act passed by Congress explicitly prohibited the use of funds to reduce troop levels below 4,000 without meeting certain conditions.21 The Pentagon never fully explained how it reconciled the drawdown with this legal restriction.

According to testimony released by the January 6 Committee, Trump’s actions went even further than publicly acknowledged. After losing the 2020 election, Trump signed a secret order directing the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Afghanistan. General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the committee that “the order was for an immediate withdrawal, and it would have been catastrophic.” Senior officials did not implement the directive, believing it lacked proper legal standing.22

Accompanying the troop reductions were significant base closures. As part of the Doha Agreement’s implementation, the United States committed to closing five military bases within 135 days. By late 2020, the U.S. had closed at least ten bases across Afghanistan, consolidating forces into larger installations.23 These closures reduced American military footprint and capability, making it harder to support Afghan forces fighting the Taliban insurgency.

The Transition That Wasn’t

When Biden took office in January 2021, his administration inherited not just the Doha Agreement’s May 1 deadline, but also a severely degraded information environment about Afghanistan policy. The transition from Trump to Biden was fraught with obstacles, as Trump refused to concede the election and his administration limited cooperation with the incoming team.24

Senior Biden officials later told reporters that they received minimal planning documents regarding the Afghanistan withdrawal. “There was no plan to evacuate our diplomats to the airport,” one senior national security official told Axios. “None of this was on the shelf, so to speak.”25 Another official added: “The entire policy process had atrophied. It was really manifest here. On the one hand, they set a May deadline for withdrawal. On the other hand, there was no interagency planning on how to execute a withdrawal.”26

The White House’s 2023 review of the withdrawal reinforced these claims, stating: “During the transition from the Trump Administration to the Biden Administration, the outgoing Administration provided no plans for how to conduct the final withdrawal or to evacuate Americans and Afghan allies. Indeed, there were no such plans in place when President Biden came into office, even with the agreed upon full withdrawal just over three months away.”27

The transition problems extended beyond planning documents. Fueled by Trump’s false claims of election fraud, his administration largely refused traditional transition communications. Biden’s team faced delays in accessing classified information, briefing senior officials, and coordinating with military commanders about the situation in Afghanistan.28

The Taliban’s Surge and Afghan Forces’ Collapse

Throughout 2020 and into 2021, even as negotiations continued and U.S. forces drew down, violence in Afghanistan escalated dramatically. Despite the Doha Agreement’s stated aim of reducing violence, Taliban attacks against Afghan security forces increased substantially. In June 2020, the Department of Defense estimated that Taliban violence was five times higher than during the February 2020 “reduction in violence” period.29

General Kenneth McKenzie, commander of U.S. Central Command, described these escalations as “not consistent with someone negotiating in good faith.”30 Yet the Trump administration continued to adhere to the withdrawal timeline, dramatically reducing air support for Afghan forces that had become dependent on American airpower.

The psychological impact of the Doha Agreement on Afghan forces proved as damaging as the tactical consequences. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction John Sopko, in testimony before Congress, confirmed that the Trump-Taliban Agreement “undercut the morale of the average Afghan soldier and the average Afghan civilian” by excluding the Afghan government from negotiations.31 Afghan soldiers and civilians alike drew a simple conclusion: if the Americans were negotiating directly with the Taliban without consulting Kabul, the war was already lost.

Afghanistan’s First Vice President Amrullah Saleh warned the United States that the prisoner releases and deal structure would lead to disaster. “I am telling [the United States] as a friend and as an ally that trusting the Taliban without putting in a verification mechanism is going to be a fatal mistake,” Saleh told the BBC, adding that Afghan leaders had warned violence would spike. “Violence has spiked,” he added grimly.32

Biden’s Constrained Options

When President Biden formally announced on April 14, 2021, that all U.S. troops would leave Afghanistan, he acknowledged the constraints he inherited. “It is perhaps not what I would have negotiated myself, but it was an agreement made by the United States government, and that means something,” Biden said, explaining his decision to extend the withdrawal deadline from May 1 to September 11, 2021 (later moved to August 31).33

Biden’s decision sparked fierce debate about whether he was bound by Trump’s agreement. Critics argued that Biden had reversed other Trump policies and could have done so here. The Biden administration countered that completely reneging on the Doha Agreement would have meant sending thousands more troops to Afghanistan to fight a resurgent Taliban, effectively restarting a war the American public wanted to end.

Military leaders who testified before Congress in September 2021 revealed they had recommended keeping 2,500 troops in Afghanistan to maintain stability. General Milley stated that he had briefed both Trump and Biden on withdrawal plans, noting that Trump had ultimately selected an option maintaining 2,500 troops through January 2021, with contingency plans for further withdrawal if ordered.34

The speed of the Afghan government’s collapse in August 2021 surprised nearly everyone. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby later stated that “no agency predicted a Taliban takeover in nine days.”35 The rapidity of the collapse reflected not just the immediate circumstances of August 2021, but the cumulative effects of years of decisions—including the legitimacy the Doha Agreement granted the Taliban, the blow to Afghan morale from being excluded from negotiations, and the return of 5,000 Taliban fighters to the battlefield.

The Blame Game and Historical Reckoning

In the aftermath of the withdrawal debacle, a fierce blame game erupted. Trump and his allies pointed to Biden’s execution of the withdrawal, particularly the decision to abandon Bagram Air Base in early July 2021 and consolidate operations at Kabul’s airport. Biden and his defenders emphasized the constraints created by the Doha Agreement and the Trump administration’s drawdown to 2,500 troops.

Both arguments contain truth. Biden made the final decision to withdraw and oversaw the chaotic evacuation that killed thirteen American service members and hundreds of Afghans in a suicide bombing at Kabul’s airport on August 26, 2021. His administration failed to execute an orderly evacuation and left thousands of Afghan allies behind.

However, the conditions that made disaster likely were created over many years and multiple administrations. The Doha Agreement’s exclusion of the Afghan government, the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners, the reduction of U.S. forces to levels insufficient to support Afghan troops, and the lack of meaningful enforcement mechanisms all predated Biden’s presidency.

A bipartisan Afghanistan Study Group, created by Congress in December 2019, presciently warned about the flaws in the Trump administration’s approach. In a February 2021 report—before Biden’s withdrawal decision—the group recommended that “the most important revision is to ensure that a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops is based not on an inflexible timeline but on all parties fulfilling their commitments, including the Taliban making good on its promises to contain terrorist groups and reduce violence.”36

These warnings went unheeded. Trump had committed to the May 1 timeline, and Biden, while extending the deadline, maintained the fundamental commitment to complete withdrawal. The result was a catastrophe that marked one of the darkest chapters in American foreign policy history.

Conclusion: Lessons Unlearned

The Afghanistan withdrawal represents a case study in how diplomatic agreements made under one administration can constrain the options available to the next, particularly when those agreements are flawed from inception. The Doha Agreement’s fundamental design—negotiating with insurgents while excluding the recognized government, setting rigid timelines without enforcement mechanisms, and making major concessions for minimal commitments—created a framework that made successful withdrawal extraordinarily difficult.

Former officials from the Trump administration have scrambled to distance themselves from the agreement they negotiated. H.R. McMaster, Trump’s former national security adviser, called it “a surrender agreement.” Lisa Curtis, who participated in the negotiations, admitted it was “a very weak agreement.” These acknowledgments came too late to alter the course of events.37

The tragedy is compounded by the fact that many of the mistakes were predictable. Excluding the Afghan government from negotiations telegraphed that their opinions didn’t matter—a message not lost on Taliban fighters or Afghan soldiers. Releasing 5,000 Taliban prisoners without robust verification mechanisms invited their return to the battlefield. Setting a fixed withdrawal date without regard to conditions on the ground surrendered American leverage and emboldened the Taliban to simply wait out the American departure.

Twenty years after American forces first entered Afghanistan in response to the September 11 attacks, they departed in chaos, leaving behind a country once again under Taliban control. The scenes of desperate Afghans clinging to departing aircraft will forever symbolize the failure of America’s longest war. Understanding how we arrived at that point requires honest accounting of decisions made across multiple administrations—including the Trump administration’s fateful choice to negotiate a flawed agreement with the Taliban while sidelining the government America had spent two decades supporting.

As the United States grapples with the lessons of Afghanistan, the role of the Doha Agreement in setting conditions for failure demands scrutiny. Future peace negotiations must avoid the mistakes of 2020: excluding legitimate governments, setting arbitrary timelines divorced from conditions on the ground, and making unenforceable agreements with actors who have little incentive to comply. The cost of such mistakes, measured in lives lost and American credibility damaged, is simply too high.

Bibliography

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Baker, Peter. “Trump’s Deal with the Taliban, Explained.” Washington Post, August 20, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/08/20/trump-peace-deal-taliban/.

Basu, Zachary. “Biden Officials: Trump Left Bare Cupboard on Afghanistan.” Axios, August 17, 2021. https://www.axios.com/2021/08/17/biden-trump-afghanistan-evacuation-blame.

Committee on Oversight and Accountability Democrats. “Oversight Democrats Call Out Republican Efforts to Whitewash Former President Trump’s Role in the Collapse of Afghan Government.” April 20, 2023. https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/news/press-releases/oversight-democrats-call-out-republican-efforts-to-whitewash-former-president.

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Cooper, Helene, and Eric Schmitt. “Trump Overruled Advisers, VP on Taliban Camp David Meeting.” CNN Politics, September 9, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/09/politics/camp-david-donald-trump-mike-pence-taliban/index.html.

———. “Republican Reps Cite 9/11 Anniversary in Criticizing Trump Decision to Invite Taliban to US for Peace Talks.” CNN Politics, September 8, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/08/politics/michael-waltz-taliban-9-11-pompeo-cnntv.

Gannon, Kathy, and Ellen Knickmeyer. “Freed Taliban Fighters Return to Jihad in Large Numbers, Breaking Peace Deal.” Foreign Policy, September 3, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/03/defying-peace-deal-freed-taliban-prisoners-return-battlefield-afghanistan/.

Hakimi, Mehdi J. “The U.S.-Taliban Agreement and the Afghan Peace Process.” Stanford Law School Rule of Law Program, December 7, 2020. https://law.stanford.edu/2020/12/07/the-u-s-taliban-agreement-and-the-afghan-peace-process/.

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———. “US Down to 2,500 Troops in Afghanistan, as Ordered by Trump.” Military Times, January 15, 2021. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2021/01/15/us-down-to-2500-troops-in-afghanistan-as-ordered-by-trump/.

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———. “Biden White House Largely Blames Trump for Troubled Troop Withdrawal from Afghanistan.” April 7, 2023. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/pentagon-release-declassified-report-afghanistan-withdraw-rcna78559.

PolitiFact. “Yes, Trump Admin. Worked to Free 5,000 Taliban Prisoners.” August 31, 2021. https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2021/aug/31/mitt-romney/mitt-romney-accurately-says-trump-administration-w/.

Schmitt, Eric. “Trump Ordered Rapid Withdrawal from Afghanistan After Election Loss.” Military Times, October 13, 2022. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2022/10/13/trump-ordered-rapid-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-after-election-loss/.

Snopes. “Did Trump Admin Get Taliban Leader Out of Pakistani Prison?” August 18, 2021. https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/trump-taliban-pakistani-prison/.

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U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. “Examining the Trump Administration’s Afghanistan Strategy, Part 2.” 116th Congress, September 19, 2019. https://www.congress.gov/event/116th-congress/house-event/LC65645/text.

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Dawn. “US Has Closed 10 Bases in Afghanistan: WP.” November 28, 2020. https://www.dawn.com/news/1592837.

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Footnotes

  1. United States Department of State, “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America,” February 29, 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf. ↩
  2. “Legal Implications of the Doha Agreement: Prospects Under a Second Trump Presidency,” Just Security, March 12, 2025, https://www.justsecurity.org/108949/legal-implications-doha-agreement-trump/. ↩
  3. Peter Baker, “Trump’s Deal with the Taliban, Explained,” Washington Post, August 20, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/08/20/trump-peace-deal-taliban/. ↩
  4. “Trump Officials Back Away from 2020 Taliban Peace Deal After Withdrawal Chaos,” Axios, August 20, 2021, https://www.axios.com/2021/08/20/trump-taliban-agreement-doha-biden. ↩
  5. Ibid. ↩
  6. State Department, “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan.” ↩
  7. “Yes, Trump Admin. Worked to Free 5,000 Taliban Prisoners,” PolitiFact, August 31, 2021, https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2021/aug/31/mitt-romney/mitt-romney-accurately-says-trump-administration-w/. ↩
  8. Congressional Research Service, “U.S.-Taliban Agreement and the Afghan Peace Process,” December 2020. ↩
  9. PolitiFact, “Trump Admin. Worked to Free 5,000 Taliban Prisoners.” ↩
  10. Kathy Gannon and Ellen Knickmeyer, “Freed Taliban Fighters Return to Jihad in Large Numbers, Breaking Peace Deal,” Foreign Policy, September 3, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/03/defying-peace-deal-freed-taliban-prisoners-return-battlefield-afghanistan/. ↩
  11. “Did Trump Admin Get Taliban Leader Out of Pakistani Prison?” Snopes, August 18, 2021, https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/trump-taliban-pakistani-prison/. ↩
  12. Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Trump Overruled Advisers, VP on Taliban Camp David Meeting,” CNN Politics, September 9, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/09/politics/camp-david-donald-trump-mike-pence-taliban/index.html. ↩
  13. Ibid. ↩
  14. Ibid. ↩
  15. “Trump Cancels Secret Meeting with the Taliban at Camp David After Deadly Bombings,” ABC News, September 8, 2019, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-trump-cancels-secret-meeting-taliban-camp-david/story?id=65465259. ↩
  16. “Republican Reps Cite 9/11 Anniversary in Criticizing Trump Decision to Invite Taliban to US for Peace Talks,” CNN Politics, September 8, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/08/politics/michael-waltz-taliban-9-11-pompeo-cnntv. ↩
  17. Ibid. ↩
  18. Aaron David Miller, “The Taliban Hardly Deserve Camp David Talks With a President. What Was Trump Thinking?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 9, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/09/taliban-hardly-deserve-camp-david-talks-with-president.-what-was-trump-thinking-pub-79813. ↩
  19. “Timeline of U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” FactCheck.org, August 17, 2021, https://www.factcheck.org/2021/08/timeline-of-u-s-withdrawal-from-afghanistan/. ↩
  20. Courtney Kube, “US Down to 2,500 Troops in Afghanistan, as Ordered by Trump,” Military Times, January 15, 2021, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2021/01/15/us-down-to-2500-troops-in-afghanistan-as-ordered-by-trump/. ↩
  21. Ibid. ↩
  22. “Trump Ordered Rapid Withdrawal from Afghanistan After Election Loss,” Military Times, October 13, 2022, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2022/10/13/trump-ordered-rapid-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-after-election-loss/. ↩
  23. “US Has Closed 10 Bases in Afghanistan: WP,” Dawn, November 28, 2020, https://www.dawn.com/news/1592837. ↩
  24. “Trump Digs in at White House, Denying Biden Transition Help on Pandemic, National Security,” ABC News, November 18, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-digs-white-house-denying-biden-transition-pandemic/story?id=74278067. ↩
  25. Zachary Basu, “Biden Officials: Trump Left Bare Cupboard on Afghanistan,” Axios, August 17, 2021, https://www.axios.com/2021/08/17/biden-trump-afghanistan-evacuation-blame. ↩
  26. Ibid. ↩
  27. National Security Council, “Summary of Review of the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” White House, April 6, 2023. ↩
  28. “Biden White House Largely Blames Trump for Troubled Troop Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” NBC News, April 7, 2023, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/pentagon-release-declassified-report-afghanistan-withdraw-rcna78559. ↩
  29. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Examining the Trump Administration’s Afghanistan Strategy, Part 2,” 116th Congress, September 19, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/event/116th-congress/house-event/LC65645/text. ↩
  30. Ibid. ↩
  31. “Oversight Democrats Call Out Republican Efforts to Whitewash Former President Trump’s Role in the Collapse of Afghan Government,” Committee on Oversight and Accountability Democrats, April 20, 2023, https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/news/press-releases/oversight-democrats-call-out-republican-efforts-to-whitewash-former-president. ↩
  32. FactCheck.org, “Timeline of U.S. Withdrawal.” ↩
  33. Ibid. ↩
  34. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, “An Assessment of the Biden Administration’s Withdrawal from Afghanistan by America’s Generals,” 118th Congress, https://www.congress.gov/event/118th-congress/house-event/LC73389/text. ↩
  35. NBC News, “Biden White House Largely Blames Trump.” ↩
  36. FactCheck.org, “Timeline of U.S. Withdrawal.” ↩
  37. Axios, “Trump Officials Back Away from 2020 Taliban Peace Deal.” ↩
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